The Evolutionary Processes for the Populations of Firms and Workers

This paper analyzes the cultural evolution of firms and workers. Following an imitation rule, each firm and worker decides whether to be innovative (or not) and skilled (or unskilled). We apply evolutionary game theory to find the system of replicator dynamics, and characterize the low-level and high-level equilibria as Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESS) “against the field.” Hence, we study how a persistent state of underdevelopment can arise in strategic environments in which players are imitative rather than rational maximizers. We show that when the current state of the economy is in the basin of attraction of the poverty trap, players should play against the field if they want to change their status quo. The threshold level to overcome the poverty trap can be lowered if there is an appropriate policy using income taxes, education costs and skill premia. Hence, we study the replicator dynamics with a subsidy and payoff taxation to overcome the poverty trap.Imitative behavior, conformism, poverty traps, skill premium, strategic complementarities

Crisis sociales y singularidades. Los fundamentos microeconómicos de las crisis sociales.

In this paper we show the strong relation existing between efficiency and social welfare. We introduce the concept of Negishi path, a differentiable manifold that shows the relation between distributions of social weights and efficient allocations. We show that it is possible to assign to each efficient allocation a certain level of social welfare, and that given the total resources of an economy and the utilities of its agents, there exits a maximal level possible of social welfare for this economy. This level will be called the Negishi number and it is independent of the distribution of the total resources. We analyze also, the strong relation existing between social crisis and distribution of the initial resources, with this object we introduce the concept of singular economies, and we show that, for these economies small changes in the endowments imply big and unpredictable social changes in the social structure and in the level of social welfare. Finally we introduce in the framework of the General Equilibrium Theory, a definition of developed and underdeveloped economies. Our guide in this trip will be the Negishi approach.: Social weights and efficiency, social crisis, regular and singular economies, Negishi approach

Two popultions, two strategies and a conflict: an evolutionary approach

In this paper we study the mathematical foundations of different evolutionary models thatanalyze the evolution of a society composed of two populations with antagonistic interests.Populations are involved in a conflict whose solution depends on the action chosen by eachindividual. None of them are able to impose a solution on the other population. Two individuals,one from each population, are randomly chosen to play a game. In a strategic way,each individual of each population, must choose one of two feasible strategies. The solutionobtained for each population will be the result of the aggregated action of the individuals.Fil: Accinelli Gamba, Elvio. Universidad Autónoma de San Luis Potosí; MéxicoFil: Martins, Felipe. Universidad de Porto; PortugalFil: Quintas, Luis Guillermo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentin

Crisis sociales y singularidades Los fundamentos microeconómicos de las crisis sociales

El propósito de este trabajo es mostrar la íntima relación que existe entre el bienestar y la eficiencia. Las asignaciones eficientes se corresponden de manera única con las distribuciones de pesos relativos de los agentes y, en conjunto, determinan una forma de medir el bienestar social asociado al total de recursos existentes en la economía. Se introduce una variedad diferencial, a la que llamaremos camino de Negishi, la cual resume la eficiencia y el bienestar posible para una economía, dados sus recursos totales y sus funciones de utilidad. Veremos que bajo una forma descentralizada, sólo es posible alcanzar algunos niveles de bienestar y no todos los posibles para esa economía, si se considera la totalidad de sus recursos. Analizaremos la relación existente entre las llamadas economías singulares y las crisis sociales, en especial, aquéllas que han vivido los países emergentes y particularmente, haremos referencia a México y a Uruguay. Estudiaremos también, de una manera formalizada y en el marco de la teoría del equilibrio general, cómo es que bajo determinadas condiciones, la política fiscal puede introducir cambios en el corto plazo que afectan irreversiblemente a la sociedad, tanto a corto como largo plazo. Así mismo, investigaremos la posibilidad del surgimiento de cambios drásticos, resultado de políticas fiscales o arancelarias gradualistas, y que se presentan como imposibles de prever e irreversibles para la estructura social. Es decir, analizaremos la posibilidad de la aparición de crisis económicas y sociales en forma inesperada y abrupta, como respuesta a cambios graduales que sin embargo, permanecen JEL classification: D50, D63, O12

Imitative Behavior and Evolutionary Dynamics for the Comparative Advantage of International Trade Theory

We claim that economic agents driven by imitative behavior may impact the industrial specialization of national economies. We use a simple two-country model, where workers and firms decide to be skilled (or unskilled) and innovative (or non-innovative). We show that comparative advantages and international trade, under the assumption of a rational strategic behavior of the economic agents, can lead countries towards either an equilibrium with high-social performance or a poverty trap

The Evolutionary Processes for the Populations of Firms and Workers

This paper analyzes the cultural evolution of firms and workers. Following an imitation rule, each firm and worker decides whether to be innovative (or not) and skilled (or unskilled). We apply evolutionary game theory to find the system of replicator dynamics, and characterize the low-level and highlevel equilibria as Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESS) “against the field.” Hence, we study how a persistent state of underdevelopment can arise in strategic environments in which players are imitative rather than rational maximizers. We show that when the current state of the economy is in the basin of attraction of the poverty trap, players should play against the field if they want to change their status quo. The threshold level to overcome the poverty trap can be lowered if there is an appropriate policy using income taxes, education costs and skill premia. Hence, we study the replicator dynamics with a subsidy and payoff taxation to overcome the poverty trap. JEL Classification: C72, C79, D83, O12

Imitative Behavior and Evolutionary Dynamics for the Comparative Advantage of International Trade Theory

We claim that economic agents driven by imitative behavior may impact the industrial specialization of national economies. We use a simple two-country model, where workers and firms decide to be skilled (or unskilled) and innovative (or non-innovative). We show that comparative advantages and international trade, under the assumption of a rational strategic behavior of the economic agents, can lead countries towards either an equilibrium with high-social performance or a poverty trap

Nash equilibrium in evolutionary competitive models of firms and workers under external regulation

The object of this paper is to study the labor market using evolutionary game theory as a framework. The entities of this competitive model are firms and workers, with and without external regulation. Firms can either innovate or not, while workers can either be skilled or not. Under the most simple model, called normal model, the economy rests in a poverty trap, where workers are not skilled and firms are not innovative. This Nash equilibria is stable even when both entities follow the optimum strategy in an on-off fashion. This fact suggests the need of an external agent that promotes the economy in order not to follow in a poverty trap. Therefore, an evolutionary competitive model is introduced, where an external regulator provides loans to encourage workers to be skilled and innovative firms. This model includes poverty traps but another Nash equilibria, where firms and workers are jointly innovative and skilled. The external regulator, in a three-phase process (loans, taxes and inactivity) achieves a common wealth, with a prosperous economy, with innovative firms and skilled workers

Crecimiento y distribución del ingreso en América Latina

Introducción / Elvio Accinelli, Osvaldo Salas -- Modelos de crecimiento económico con desigualdad dinámica / Enrique R. Casares, Leobardo Plata, Lucía A. Ruiz G. -- Crecimiento, imitación y trampas de la pobreza / Elvio Accinelli, Edgar J. Sánchez Carrera -- La distribución del ingreso. Medición y construcción de indicadores de desigualdad / Alexis Palma, Leobardo Plata -- El fenómeno de la desigualdad en Argentina / Silvia London, Mara Rojas -- Economic growth and income inequality in Brazil / Joaquim Andrade, Jose Angelo Divino, Leonardo Alves Rangel -- Chile: una economía de alto crecimiento y desigualdad social / Osvaldo Salas -- Distribución del ingreso y crecimiento económico en Colombia / Luis Carlos Guzmán R. -- La transformación de la economía en Costa Rica / Juan Rafael Vargas -- Crecimiento económico y desigualdad en Guatemala / Eddy Roberto Carpio Sam, Manuel de Jesús Castro Aguirre -- Tributación y distribución del ingreso en México en un modelo de equilibrio general aplicado / Enrique R. Casares, Lucía A. Ruiz, Horacio Sobarzo -- La desigualdad de los ingresos en Uruguay / Marisa Bucheli, Cecilia Gonzále